Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore
4.6.0
Prefix Reserved
See the version list below for details.
dotnet add package Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore --version 4.6.0
NuGet\Install-Package Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore -Version 4.6.0
<PackageReference Include="Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore" Version="4.6.0" />
<PackageVersion Include="Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore" Version="4.6.0" />
<PackageReference Include="Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore" />
paket add Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore --version 4.6.0
#r "nuget: Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore, 4.6.0"
#:package Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore@4.6.0
#addin nuget:?package=Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore&version=4.6.0
#tool nuget:?package=Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore&version=4.6.0
Stratara.Identity.AspNetCore
Derived. The behaviour described here is specified under
openspec/specs/. Those specifications are the source; this page explains and illustrates them.
License: MIT.
Channel-agnostic ASP.NET Core identity wiring for the Stratara stack. Provides the AddAspNetIdentity / AddAspNetIdentityWithSignInManager extension methods and an IStrataraSignInManager wrapper around the ASP.NET Core SignInManager. Channel-specific glue (Blazor Server's AuthenticationStateProvider, MAUI session-state forwarders, etc.) is the consumer's responsibility — Stratara intentionally stops at the ASP.NET-Core-generic surface to stay application-agnostic.
What's in the box
| Folder | Contents |
|---|---|
DependencyInjection/AspCoreIdentityHostBuilderExtensions |
AddAspNetIdentity<TUser, TIdentityDbContext>() (Stratara password/schema-v3/passkey defaults — no lockout), AddAspNetIdentityWithSignInManager<TUser, TIdentityDbContext>() (same + lockout defaults + AspNetSignInManager + localization), AddDevelopmentNoOpEmailSender<TUser>() (dev-only, throws in Production) |
Lockout only ships with the sign-in manager.
ApplyStrataraLockoutDefaultsruns insideAddAspNetIdentityWithSignInManageronly — the bareAddAspNetIdentityleaves ASP.NET Identity's own lockout defaults in place. If you wire sign-in yourself on top ofAddAspNetIdentity, configureIdentityOptions.Lockoutexplicitly; otherwise password attempts are not throttled the way the rest of this package assumes. |Services/AspNetSignInManager<TUser>| WrapsSignInManager<TUser>+UserManager<TUser>and producesStrataraSignInResultwith already-localized failure messages | |Services/IdentityNoOpEmailSender<TUser>| Development-time email sender that drops every email (Task.CompletedTask); replace in production | |Resources/IdentityResources| Resource-anchor for sign-in failure messages. English default ships inIdentityResources.resx;IdentityResources.de.resxprovides German overrides.AddAspNetIdentityWithSignInManagercallsAddLocalization()soIStringLocalizer<IdentityResources>resolves automatically. | |DependencyInjection/MembershipClaimsServiceCollectionExtensions+Services/MembershipClaims*| Sign-in tenant-claim bridge:AddMembershipTenantClaim<TUser>()(stampstratara:tenant_idat issuance) andAddMembershipTenantClaimsTransformation()(resolve live per request) | |Authorization/*+DependencyInjection/PermissionPolicyServiceCollectionExtensions|AddStrataraPermissionPolicies()— every catalog permission becomes an on-demand[Authorize("...")]policy backed byIPermissionResolver| |Authentication/ApiKey*+DependencyInjection/ApiKeyAuthenticationExtensions|AddStrataraApiKey()(X-Api-Key scheme overIApiKeyStore) andAddStrataraAuthSchemeSelector()(route API-key vs. Bearer vs. cookie by request shape) | |Authentication/Stratara{OpenIdConnect,JwtBearer}Options+DependencyInjection/OpenIdConnectAuthenticationExtensions|AddStrataraOpenIdConnect(configuration)(interactive external login) andAddStrataraJwtBearer(configuration)(API access-token validation, multi-issuer byiss) | |Services/ExternalLoginProvisioningService<TUser>+DependencyInjection/ExternalLoginProvisioningExtensions|AddStrataraExternalLoginProvisioning<TUser>()— hardened JIT create/link of local accounts on first external sign-in (see below) |
Localization
AspNetSignInManager resolves its four user-facing failure messages (Identity.SignIn.Lockout, Identity.SignIn.InvalidCredentials, Identity.SignIn.InvalidTwoFactor, Identity.SignIn.InvalidRecoveryCode) via IStringLocalizer<IdentityResources>. A "not allowed" sign-in deliberately maps onto the InvalidCredentials message rather than getting its own, to avoid confirming that an account exists. Languages out of the box: English (default) and German (de). To add another culture, ship a satellite .resx (e.g. IdentityResources.fr.resx) in your own assembly and register a chained IStringLocalizer<IdentityResources> if needed. Selection follows CultureInfo.CurrentUICulture — wire up app.UseRequestLocalization(...) to map this from the request.
Quick start
// Channel-agnostic ASP.NET Core host (MVC, Razor Pages, Minimal API, ...):
builder.AddAspNetIdentityWithSignInManager<ApplicationUser, IdentityDbContext>();
// Or for a host without sign-in manager (e.g. a worker that only needs identity stores):
builder.AddAspNetIdentity<ApplicationUser, IdentityDbContext>();
For Blazor Server hosts, additionally register your own IStrataraAuthenticationStateProvider implementation (and the AuthenticationStateProvider forwarder). Stratara does not ship a Blazor-specific provider — the previous BlazorAuthenticationStateProvider lived here in 1.x but moved out in v2.0.0 to keep this package application-agnostic.
External login (OpenID Connect) + JIT provisioning
Add external identity providers as ordinary authentication schemes and provision local accounts on first sign-in:
builder.Services
.AddAuthentication(StrataraAuthSchemeSelectorOptions.SchemeName)
.AddCookie(IdentityConstants.ApplicationScheme)
.AddStrataraOpenIdConnect(builder.Configuration) // interactive "log in with <provider>"
.AddStrataraJwtBearer(builder.Configuration) // API access-token validation (iss-routed)
.AddStrataraAuthSchemeSelector(); // route Bearer vs. cookie per request
builder.Services.AddStrataraExternalLoginProvisioning<ApplicationUser>();
AddStrataraOpenIdConnect binds Identity:OpenIdConnect (Authority, ClientId, ClientSecret,
Scopes) and AddStrataraJwtBearer binds Identity:JwtBearer (Authority, Audience, ValidIssuers).
Both key the principal on the issuer sub, never on email — Entra, Keycloak, and generic OIDC differ
only in configuration.
ExternalLoginProvisioningService<TUser> creates or links the local account on a first external
sign-in with the account-takeover defenses on by default: it links on the issuer's (provider, sub);
auto-links to a pre-existing account only when the email is verified by the provider
(email_verified/xms_edov) and already confirmed locally — otherwise it returns
RequiresInteractiveLinking and refuses to merge; honors an optional invitation gate and an
AutoProvision switch; and fails closed. Call it from your sign-in callback (for example the OpenID
Connect OnTicketReceived event). The Stratara.Sample.Identity sample shows the full wiring.
Dependencies
Stratara.Identity.Core— channel-agnostic abstractions (IStrataraSignInManager,IStrataraAuthenticationStateProvider) + shared model records.Stratara.Shared— multitenancy + session-context types.Microsoft.AspNetCore.App— shared framework reference forSignInManager,IEmailSender<TUser>, etc.Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore— ASP.NET Identity stores.Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect,Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer— external-login OIDC + API bearer-token schemes.Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens,System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt— JWT helpers for token-based flows.
| Product | Versions Compatible and additional computed target framework versions. |
|---|---|
| .NET | net10.0 is compatible. net10.0-android was computed. net10.0-browser was computed. net10.0-ios was computed. net10.0-maccatalyst was computed. net10.0-macos was computed. net10.0-tvos was computed. net10.0-windows was computed. |
-
net10.0
- Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer (>= 10.0.13)
- Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect (>= 10.0.13)
- Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore (>= 10.0.13)
- Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens (>= 8.23.0)
- Stratara.Identity.Core (>= 4.6.0)
- Stratara.Shared (>= 4.6.0)
- System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt (>= 8.23.0)
NuGet packages
This package is not used by any NuGet packages.
GitHub repositories
This package is not used by any popular GitHub repositories.
| Version | Downloads | Last Updated |
|---|---|---|
| 4.8.0 | 0 | 11/6/2026 |
| 4.7.1 | 95 | 11/5/2026 |
| 4.7.0 | 529 | 10/30/2026 |
| 4.6.1 | 96 | 10/29/2026 |
| 4.6.0 | 191 | 10/28/2026 |
| 4.5.0 | 260 | 10/28/2026 |
| 4.4.10 | 206 | 10/26/2026 |
| 4.4.9 | 95 | 10/26/2026 |
| 4.4.8 | 243 | 10/24/2026 |
| 4.4.7 | 109 | 10/23/2026 |
| 4.4.6 | 206 | 10/22/2026 |
| 4.4.5 | 641 | 10/14/2026 |
| 4.4.4 | 386 | 10/10/2026 |
| 4.4.3 | 125 | 10/10/2026 |
| 4.4.2 | 459 | 10/2/2026 |
| 4.4.1 | 425 | 9/29/2026 |
| 4.4.0 | 142 | 9/27/2026 |
| 4.3.1 | 137 | 9/25/2026 |
| 4.3.0 | 405 | 9/23/2026 |
| 4.2.0 | 166 | 9/18/2026 |
An erasure shreds every key that names the subject, and nothing stopped the next encryption for that subject
from creating a new one: a key store asked for a scope it does not hold creates a first version. A job, a request
in flight or a second process that encrypted for an erased subject afterwards got a fresh key, and what it wrote
stayed readable for good. The key store now records an erased subject and refuses to create a key for it again.
### Added
- **`IKeyStore.MarkSubjectErasedAsync(KeySubject)`** records that a tenant or user has been erased. It has a
default implementation that throws `NotSupportedException`, so an existing key store still compiles.
- **`KeySubject`** names the tenant or user, and `KeySubject.Covers(KeyScope)` states which keys belong to its
erasure: for a tenant, a key of any level that names it; for a user, a user-level key that names it.
- **`KeyScopeErasedException`** (an `InvalidOperationException`) is what a key store throws for such a scope. It
carries the refused `Scope`.
### Changed
- **An encryption for an erased subject fails.** After a subject's erasure, `GetOrCreateCurrentKeyAsync` and
`RotateAsync` throw `KeyScopeErasedException` for every scope the subject covers, whether or not it ever held a
key, and create nothing. The blob encryptor, the encrypting settings store and the field-encrypting serializer
pass it through. Code that erased a subject and then wrote encrypted data for it again now sees the exception;
the mark is permanent and cannot be lifted. Revoking every version of a scope is not an erasure and marks nothing.
- **`ISubjectEraser` marks the subject before it sweeps any plane**, so an encryption racing the erasure
either creates its key first, and that key is shredded with the rest, or is refused. A key store that cannot mark
a subject leaves the erasure as before and logs `SubjectNotMarkable` (112009).
- **The file-backed key store writes format version 2**, which holds the marks, and refuses to open a file in a
newer format than it knows. `InMemoryKeyStore` refuses an erased subject as the file store does; `DummyKeyStore`
refuses to mark one, as it refuses every erasure operation.
**Upgrading:**
- **Upgrade every process that shares a key store file in one step.** A process on an earlier release reads a
version-2 file, ignores the marks, creates keys for an erased subject and drops the marks the next time it writes
the file. A version-1 file needs no migration. Rolling back is possible but loses the marks on the first write.
- **Map `KeyScopeErasedException` to your answer for data that is gone**, if a request can reach an encryption for
a subject after its erasure.
- **A key store of your own implements `MarkSubjectErasedAsync`**, refusing in `GetOrCreateCurrentKeyAsync` and
`RotateAsync` every scope a marked subject `Covers`. Without it the erasure warns and the gap stays open.