Stratara.Security 3.1.1

dotnet add package Stratara.Security --version 3.1.1
                    
NuGet\Install-Package Stratara.Security -Version 3.1.1
                    
This command is intended to be used within the Package Manager Console in Visual Studio, as it uses the NuGet module's version of Install-Package.
<PackageReference Include="Stratara.Security" Version="3.1.1" />
                    
For projects that support PackageReference, copy this XML node into the project file to reference the package.
<PackageVersion Include="Stratara.Security" Version="3.1.1" />
                    
Directory.Packages.props
<PackageReference Include="Stratara.Security" />
                    
Project file
For projects that support Central Package Management (CPM), copy this XML node into the solution Directory.Packages.props file to version the package.
paket add Stratara.Security --version 3.1.1
                    
#r "nuget: Stratara.Security, 3.1.1"
                    
#r directive can be used in F# Interactive and Polyglot Notebooks. Copy this into the interactive tool or source code of the script to reference the package.
#:package Stratara.Security@3.1.1
                    
#:package directive can be used in C# file-based apps starting in .NET 10 preview 4. Copy this into a .cs file before any lines of code to reference the package.
#addin nuget:?package=Stratara.Security&version=3.1.1
                    
Install as a Cake Addin
#tool nuget:?package=Stratara.Security&version=3.1.1
                    
Install as a Cake Tool

Stratara.Security

License: FSL-1.1-MIT (Functional Source License — source-available; converts to MIT after 2 years). Not OSI-approved OSS.

Dependency-light key store and envelope encryption for Stratara. Provides a production IKeyStore with KEK-wrapped, versioned per-scope data-encryption keys (rotation, revoke, and crypto-shred), a file-backed master-key provider, and an AES-GCM blob encryptor — referencing only Stratara.Abstractions + BCL crypto. No EF Core, RabbitMQ, Redis, or cloud SDKs in the graph.

Quick start

// appsettings / secrets:
// "Stratara": { "KeyStore": { "MasterKeyBase64": "<openssl rand -base64 32>", "StorePath": "/var/run/secrets/keystore.json" } }

builder.Services.AddStrataraFileKeyStore(builder.Configuration);

// Encrypt a blob bound to a tenant scope + purpose:
var scope = new KeyScope(DataSensitivityLevel.TenantScoped, tenantId: "acme-corp");
await using var encrypted = await encryptor.EncryptAsync(plainStream, scope, purpose: "attachment");
await using var plain = await encryptor.DecryptAsync(encrypted, scope);

What's inside

  • EnvelopeFileKeyStore (IKeyStore) — random 32-byte DEK per scope/version, KEK-wrapped with AES-256-GCM (wrap AAD bound to the key id, so a wrapped DEK can't be moved to another scope). The store file holds only wrapped DEKs + metadata, never plaintext. RotateAsync adds a version; RevokeAsync makes one version undecryptable; EraseScopeAsync deletes all versions for a scope (GDPR Art. 17 crypto-shred). DEKs are zeroed after use; the store file is written 0600 on Unix.
  • FileMasterKeyProvider (IMasterKeyProvider) — KEK from MasterKeyBase64, validated to decode to exactly 32 bytes (AES-256) at startup. The custody seam: swap for an HSM / KMS / vault provider later without touching the stored data.
  • AesGcmSecureBlobEncryptor (ISecureBlobEncryptor) — AES-GCM stream encryption with a purpose-bound AAD ({tenant}||{purpose}) and a versioned, self-describing format (v2 leading byte). Reads legacy streams without the version byte; set Stratara:BlobEncryption:LegacyBlobsCarryPurpose to match the legacy layout.
  • DummyKeyStore — Development-only deterministic fallback (throws outside Development).

Key id schema

{level}:{tenant}:{user}:v{N} — e.g. TenantScoped:acme-corp::v1. GetOrCreateCurrentKeyAsync returns the highest non-revoked version (creating v1 if none); RotateAsync creates v{N+1}.

Dependencies

  • Stratara.Abstractions
  • Stratara.Diagnostics
  • Microsoft.Extensions.{Configuration,DependencyInjection,Hosting,Logging}.Abstractions
  • Microsoft.Extensions.Options (+ Options.ConfigurationExtensions)
Product Compatible and additional computed target framework versions.
.NET net10.0 is compatible.  net10.0-android was computed.  net10.0-browser was computed.  net10.0-ios was computed.  net10.0-maccatalyst was computed.  net10.0-macos was computed.  net10.0-tvos was computed.  net10.0-windows was computed. 
Compatible target framework(s)
Included target framework(s) (in package)
Learn more about Target Frameworks and .NET Standard.

NuGet packages (1)

Showing the top 1 NuGet packages that depend on Stratara.Security:

Package Downloads
Stratara.Infrastructure

Infrastructure glue for the Stratara framework — authorization decorators, configuration providers, and DI composition helpers that wire Mediator, Outbox, Identity, and EF Core into a hosted app.

GitHub repositories

This package is not used by any popular GitHub repositories.

Version Downloads Last Updated
3.1.1 0 6/1/2026
3.1.0 46 5/30/2026

### Fixed

- **`FileMasterKeyProvider` now rejects a master KEK that is not exactly 32 bytes at startup.**
 The KEK is used directly as an AES-256-GCM key, which accepts only 16/24/32-byte keys. The
 provider previously required merely *at least* 32 bytes, so a longer KEK (for example the
 48-byte output of `openssl rand -base64 48`, a common HKDF master-key recipe) passed both
 construction and the eager `FileKeyStoreStartupProbe`, then threw
 `CryptographicException: Specified key is not a valid size for this algorithm` on the **first**
 key creation at runtime — defeating the purpose of the boot-time probe. The provider now
 validates the decoded length is exactly 32 bytes and fails fast at boot with an actionable
 message (`Generate one with: openssl rand -base64 32`). A 32-byte KEK is unaffected.
- **`EnvelopeFileKeyStore` is now safe for multiple processes sharing one store file** (for
 example several containers bind-mounting the same host directory). Previously a process only
 read the store once at construction, so a data-encryption key created by another process after
 startup was invisible (`GetDataEncryptionKeyAsync` returned `null`, breaking decryption), and
 two processes creating keys concurrently could overwrite each other's keys or mint colliding
 versions for the same scope. Reads now reload from disk on a cache miss (guarded by the file's
 last-write time to avoid reload storms), and every mutation serializes through an exclusive
 cross-process lock file and re-reads the latest on-disk state before writing. A networked file
 system (NFS/SMB) remains unsupported — it guarantees neither atomic rename nor reliable advisory
 locks.

### Added

- **`LogEvents.KeyManagement.KeyStoreReloaded` (112_006)** — debug-level event emitted when the
 file key store reloads its state from disk to pick up keys written by another process.